Government quality determinants of stock market performance in African countries by Simplice  A, Asongu
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Government quality determinants of
stock market performance in African
countries
Asongu Simplice A
23. June 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39631/
MPRA Paper No. 39631, posted 24. June 2012 02:55 UTC
Forthcoming: Journal of African Business , xxx(2012)xxx
Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in African 
Countries
Simplice A. Asongu
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com
Tel: 0032 473613172
HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
Rue Louvrex 14, Bldg. N1, B-4000 Liège,  Belgium
1
Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in African 
Countries
Abstract
How do government policies and institutions affect stock market performance? As stock 
markets  grow broader  and deeper  in  African  countries,  the  question  becomes  more  critical. 
Government quality dynamics of corruption-control, government-effectiveness, political-stability 
or no violence, voice & accountability, regulation quality and rule of law are instrumented with 
income-levels,  religious-dominations,  press-freedom degrees  and  legal-origins  to  account  for 
stock  market  performance  dynamics  of  capitalization,  value  traded,  turnover  and number  of 
listed  companies.  The  results  demonstrate  a  significant  positive  association  between  stock 
market performance measures and the quality of government institutions. These findings suggest 
countries with better developed government institutions would favor stock markets with higher 
market capitalization, better turnover ratios, higher value in shares traded and greater number of 
listed companies.
JEL Classification: G10; G18; G28; P16; P43
Keywords:  Financial Markets; Government Policy; Political Economy
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1.  Introduction
The  emergence  of  London  as  a  world  financial  center  was  made  possible  by  the 
reputation of fairness that the English courts and common-law had acquired by the 20 th century 
(Rosenberg & Birdzell,  1986).  The Russian experience  has  shown that  foreign investors  are 
willing to provide funds and much needed managing expertise to newly privatized firms only if 
the  legal  and  political  infrastructure  is  adequate  at  curbing  corruption  among  government 
officials and limiting the risks of expropriation(Lambardo,2000; Lombardo & Pagano,2002).
The  deepening  and broadening  of  stock  markets  in  developing  countries  presents  an 
important concern of how government policies and institutions affect stock market performance. 
According to  the IMF (2006) and Mosley (2008) stock market  capitalization  stood at  $37.2 
trillion,  compared to global GDP of $41.3 trillion. Whereas this figure was slightly less than 
global  commercial  bank  assets  ($  57.3  trillion),  it  markedly  exceeded  the  total  size  of 
outstanding public securities, which stood at $ 23.1 trillion.  The bulk of global stock market 
capitalization broadly represents developed-country equity markets, but less developed countries 
which accounted for 14% of total capitalization in 2004 are quickly gaining ground. For instance 
some emerging markets like those of Malaysia,  Singapore and South Africa have total  stock 
market capitalizations that exceed their respective Gross Domestic Products.  The overall growth 
of  developing  financial  markets  has  attracted  attention  from  scholars  and  pundits.  A  large 
literature  in  economics,  political  science  and public  policy considers  the ways  in  which  the 
increased globalization in trade and finance affects national economic outcomes and government 
policy  making  (Helleiner,  1994;  Strange,  1996;  Friedman,  1999;  Armijo,  1999;  Obstfeld  & 
Taylor, 2004). However, given the increasing importance of developing capital markets in the 
world economy, we currently know very little about how government quality influences financial 
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market  dynamics.  In  this  work  we  address  this  gap  by  exploring  how  government  quality 
dynamics  of  corruption-control,  government-effectiveness,  political-stability  (or  no violence), 
voice & accountability, regulation quality and rule of law, affect stock market performance in 
African financial markets.
The main idea is that the process of increasing stock market value depends on appropriate 
policies  that  are  the  outcome  of  good  governance.  Therefore  is  it  important  to  identify 
institutional  factors that promote the performance of African financial  markets  for two main 
reasons. (1) The current African business climate depicts a dire need for alternative forms of 
investment  beside  the  failed  attempts  to  attract  foreign  direct  investment(FDI)  through 
liberalization policies(Rolfe & Woodward,2004). (2) A rapidly expanding empirical literature 
demonstrates that the quality of a country’s capital markets depends on the quality of its rules on 
corporate  governance  and  disclosure.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  the  institutional  environment  in 
Africa over the last decade has been plagued by corruption, political strife and a host of investor 
unfriendly governance qualms(Kenyan post election crises in 2007/2008, Zimbabwe’s economic 
meltdown, Nigeria’s marred transition in 2008, the unending Egyptian revolution, not to mention 
recent coups d’états in Mali and Guinea-Bissau). 
This study aims to assess three main concerns.  Firstly, investigate how the process by 
which those in authority are selected and replaced(political governance: voice & accountability 
and  political  stability)  affect  the  smooth  running  of  financial  markets.  Secondly,  assess  the 
manner in which stock market health is affected by the capacity of governments to formulate & 
implement  policies,  as  well  as  deliver  services(economic  governance:  regulatory  quality  and 
government effectiveness). Thirdly, examine how the respect of citizens and state for institutions 
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that govern interactions among them affect capital markets(institutional governance: rule of law 
and corruption control).
The paper’s contribution to the literature is fivefold. (1) Owing to lack of relevant data, 
the  nexus  between  formal  institutions  and  stock  market  performance  in  Africa  has  escaped 
scholarly attention. Beside, good governance indicators for African countries seeing  the light of 
day only in 1996, most stock markets in the continent were still at their infancy with only scanty 
exploitable  data  available.  (2)  The  increasing  depth  of  stock  markets  in  African  countries 
represent  an important  challenge  to  policies  and institutions.  Hence  the  need to  assess  how 
political,  economic and institutional  governance plays-out on the performance of these stock 
markets. (3) The current African business climate depicts a dire need for alternative forms of 
investment  owing  to  failed  liberalization  policies  that  sought  to  attract  FDI(Rolfe  & 
Woodward,2004). Indeed the African business environment is increasingly faced with the need 
for alternative forms of investment(beside those accruing from failing privatization projects) and 
financing sources for  firms.  The available  weight  of  evidence  on business challenges  in  the 
continent  suggests  that,  this  need  for  alternative  capital  flows  is  compounded  by  issues  of 
regulatory  and  institutional  quality(Bartel  et  al.,2009;  Toumi,2011;  Darley,2012).  Hence  the 
motivation for investigating the bearing of good governance policies on an alternative long-term 
financial source: stock markets. (4) Current stock market trends in the continent suggest that 
those  in  French speaking sub-Sahara have been slow to pick-up. The outcome of this study 
could provide the much needed policy measures necessary to help them  gain even-pace with 
their English speaking counterparts. (5) In spite of the large chunk of studies in the institutional-
finance literature, very few works have focused on developing countries, especially the African 
continent. Much scholarly focus has been on the emerging economies of Latin America and East 
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Asia. Alagidede(2008) has suggested a reason for such neglect could be traced to the African 
institutional environment; hence the need assess the incidence of formal institutions on long-term 
financial performance dynamics. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews existing 
literature. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical 
analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical framework
In  this  section,  we provide  theoretical  premises  to  justify  the  choice  of  instrumental 
variables for the empirical phase of the paper. Therefore, we provide theoretical justification to 
the empirical validity of legal-origins, income-levels, religious-dominations and press-freedom 
qualities in the finance-growth nexus. These will be presented in four main strands. 
In the first strand, we highlight the imperative for legal-origin moment conditions. This 
could  be explained  from two standpoints:  the ‘law & finance’  theory and the ‘political  and 
adaptability’  channels.  The  first  stance  of  the  ‘law & finance’  theory emphasizes  that  legal 
institutions  have  a  bearing  on corporate  finance  and financial  development  (La  Porta  et  al., 
1998).  The  ‘law  &  finance’  theory  stresses  that  cross-country  disparities  in  (i)  contract, 
company,  bankruptcy and security laws, (ii)  the legal  system’s  emphasis on private property 
rights,  and  (iii)  the  efficiency  of  enforcement;  influence  the  degree  of  expropriation  and 
consequently the confidence with which people purchase securities and take part in financial 
markets.  In the second stance we find theories by Beck et al. (2003) which assess ‘why’ legal 
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origin matter in financial development.  They examine two mechanisms by which legal origins 
may influence financial development: the political1 and adaptability2 channels. 
In the second strand, we provide theoretical justification to the choice of wealth-effect 
instrumental variables. It has been well documented that income-levels, play a substantial role in 
the finance-growth nexus (Beck et al., 1999; Asongu, 2011a). From theoretical and empirical 
literature premises, considerable differences in wealth exiting across countries have substantial 
effects  on cross-country  disparities  in  financial  structure  and development  (Asongu,  2012a). 
Theoretical justification for income-levels is grounded on three perspectives. Firstly,  financial 
intermediary development embodies:  central  banks assets to total  assets, deposit money bank 
assets to total assets, other financial institutions’ assets to total assets and deposit money versus 
central  bank assets (Beck et al.1999, p.13). With respect to this position, central  banks loose 
relative importance as one moves from low to high-income countries, whereas other financial 
institutions  gain  relative  importance  in  the  process.  Conversely,  deposit  money  banks  gain 
importance vis-à-vis central  banks with a higher income level. Financial depth also increases 
with income levels.  Secondly,  private credit and life insurance companies, the life insurance 
penetration  and  the  life  insurance  density  increase  with  per  capita  economic  prosperity. 
Interestingly,  for the first  two indicators,  the lower-middle income group exhibits  the lowest 
medians (Beck et al., 1999, p.21)3.  Thirdly, there is a significant difference in size, activity and 
1The political mechanism is based on two standpoints. Firstly, legal traditions differ in the emphasis they attribute to 
protecting the rights of private investors vis-à-vis those of the state. Secondly, private property rights protection  
make-up the foundation for financial development.
2 The second channel linking legal-origin to financial development is the adaptability mechanism that is also built 
on  two  foundations.  Firstly,  legal  systems  differ  in  their  ability  to  adjust  to  changing  and  evolving 
circumstances(situations). Secondly, when a country’s legal system adapts only timidly to changing circumstances  
(especially economic), large gaps will open between the financial needs of an economy and the ability of the legal  
system to support and fulfill those needs.
3 It is worthwhile noting that high-income countries demonstrate a life insurance penetration ten times as high as 
lower-middle income countries  and  a  life  insurance  density  nearly one hundred  times higher  than low-income 
countries.
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efficiency of stock markets across income groups. Countries with higher levels of per capita 
economic prosperity have bigger, more active and more efficient financial markets (Beck et al., 
1999, 25)4.
In the third strand we lay the theoretical basis for the empirical validity of the religious 
instruments. Borrowing from Hearn et al.(2011), Islam represents a system of beliefs founded on 
the interpretation of passages from the Qu’ran and various Had’ith & Sunnah that are short texts 
regarding  customs  of  the  Muslim  community  and  relating  experiences  of  the  prophet 
Mohammed(Pryor, 2007). These form the basis of Shari’ya law, that permeates all areas of the 
wider Islamic system, including economics, finance, law, politics & government and that have 
common values of Islamic social justice(Asutey,2007). The Islamic financial system is premised 
and regulated on the same Shari’ya principles as the overall economy and society (Iqbal, 1997). 
These govern the design of institutions  and the  nature of contracts  to  guide the market  and 
regulation of participants’ behavior. Hence, individuals within an Islamic financial system will 
be subject to behavioral norms, that give rise to very heterogeneous assumptions to those which 
form the foundation of regulation in western markets. 
In  the  last  strand,  we highlight  a  case  for  the validity  of  press-freedom instrumental  
variables. From a theoretical standpoint, press-freedom and the Efficiency Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) of finance move hand-in-gove. Empirically,  freedom of the press is one of the major 
efficient market channels and only with unrestricted press-freedom can information be rapidly 
spread and fully incorporated into asset prices (Guo-Ping, 2008). 
4 Let us also note here that, wealthy countries also have larger bond markets and issue more equity & private bonds. 
Financial  markets  have  soared  in  size,  activity  and  efficiency over the last  three  decades  owing to significant  
changes in higher GDP per capita countries. 
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2. 2 Government quality, stock market performance and growth 
Democracy and  good governance(  or  government  quality:  GQ) have  been  subject  to 
much attention in circles dealing with developing countries. GQ is now used by many national 
development  agencies  and international  organizations  such as  the  World  Bank,  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations to assess the state of developing countries.  In 
1996,  the  concern  of  the  IMF  with  development  could  be  summarized  in  the  following 
declaration:  "promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of  
law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as  
essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper” (IMF, 2005). Elements 
of this definition will guide our conception of GQ through-out the paper.
As  we  have  outlined  earlier,  this  paper  investigates  how  GQ  dynamics  affect  the 
performance of stock markets in African countries. GQ describes the institutional arrangements 
that regulate financial markets. These institutions compose the legal, political and supervisory 
bodies that provide cohesion and order in business activities. The equitable functioning of the 
legal process, the degree of political stability, the level of systematic corruption, the height of 
voice & accountability, the rule of law and regulation quality are factors that define the quality of 
these institutions and their ability to oversee financial markets. GQ has important implications on 
the dealings of firms and institutions, as well as  the cost associated with such interactions. 
The capacity of the judiciary to enforce contractual rights of shareholders impinges on 
the possibility of managerial expropriation and ultimately on the profitability of firms. In this 
line of thought, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue that improving corporate governance rules, 
their enforcements and the quality of accounting standards results in greater reliance on stock 
market  financing by companies.  More so, judicial  factors directly infringe on the amount  of 
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corporate resources diverted by managers and allow shareholders the possibility of monitoring 
managers at  lower cost. Legal systems supportive of investor protection tend to improve the 
amount of funds that risk-averse investors are willing to channel towards firms. Some authors 
have pointed to the importance of legal environments and corporate standards in fund manager 
investments (Aggarwal et al., 2002).  
GQ environment can increase returns to shareholders by reducing both transaction and 
agency costs. The early literature on GQ is focused on firm-level agency cost arising from the 
ownership and control delineation structure of firms. The seminal work of Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) provided the conceptual framework for a growing body of studies. The pioneering work 
discovered  that  corporate  governance  mechanisms  themselves  are  subject  to  varying 
interpretations and weak degrees of enforceability and that the level of investor protection which 
such mechanisms were designed to promote could deteriorate in the face of structurally flawless 
governance provisions. Thus the strength of such mechanisms rested solely on the ability of 
firms to adhere to them. Consequently, enforceability of contractual provisions became the first 
extension in the conception and understanding of the agency conflict  between managers and 
shareholders.  In  recent  literature  however,  the  focus  has  been  shifted  from  firm-specific 
governance to country-level governance environments (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Shleifer & 
Wolfenson, 2002; Asongu, 2011bcdef; Agbor, 2011). Beyond the interaction between firms and 
institutions resulting from agency cost, transaction costs have been the neglect in many market-
centered views of economic structure. North (1994) argued that tightly defined property rights 
and their cost effective enforcements are important requirements for low-cost transactions which 
are paramount to productive economies. 
10
The benefits  of judicial  improvements include not only stock market enlargement but 
also greater integration with world financial markets through the appeal to influx of capital. But 
increasing integration may turn to decrease the importance of the quality of securities regulation. 
According to Hooper et al. (2009) increasing market integration significantly lowers the cost of 
capital.   Hail  & Leuz  (2003)  investigate  to  what  extent  the  effect  of  legal  institutions  and 
securities regulation differs by market regulation and economic progress. Supposing investors 
can invest freely around the world, the quality of securities regulation of any particular country 
may  become  less  important.  From both  theoretical  and empirical  evidence,  country-specific 
factors become less important in asset pricing as markets become more integrated (Bekaert & 
Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999). However note should be taken of the fact that, the precedence of this 
increasing integration are the benefits of judicial enforcement and environmental GQ.  Hail & 
Leuz(2003) assess international differences in the cost of equity for firms across 40 countries. 
They analyze if differences in countries’ legal institutions (and in particular securities regulation) 
are systematically related to international cost of capital variations. Their findings reveal that 
firms in countries with strong legal institutions have on average lower cost of capital than those 
in countries with weak legal systems, after controlling for risk and country factors.  In essence,  
cost of capital is systematically lower in countries with strong securities regulation which have 
extensive disclosure rules and strong legal enforcement. Thus, effects are highest for institutions 
that mandate disclosure to investors and are also present for those institutions that facilitate the 
enforcement of financial contracts, either by lowering the burden of proof in securities litigation 
or by providing effective courts. 
Rosenberg & Birdzell (1986) postulate the emergence of London as a world financial 
center was made possible by the reputation of fairness that the English courts and common-law 
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had acquired by the 20th century. The experience of transitional economies and the central role 
that legal institutions play in the functioning of markets has been abundantly discussed (La Porta 
et al., 2000b). The Russian experience has shown that foreign investors are willing to provide 
funds and much  needed managing  expertise  to  newly privatized  firms  only if  the  legal  and 
political  infrastructure  is  adequate  in  curbing  corruption  among  government  officials  and 
limiting the risks of expropriation(Lambardo,2000;  Lombardo & Pagano,2002).  Lombardo & 
Pagano(2002) join Johnson  & Shleifer(1999) in underlining that, in order to reap the benefits 
from market-oriented reforms, policy makers in transition economies must make sure that a fair 
level  playing  field  is  established  so  that  investors  can  concentrate  on  exploiting  growth 
opportunities without fearing the abuse of their property rights. 
Another  important  GQ dynamic  developing  countries  must  enforce  is  the  control  of 
corruption which is often the source of insider-dealing and a great many impediments to the 
smooth growth of financial markets. Bhattacharya & Daouk(1999) assess the impact on the cost 
of equity capital of insider trading regulation and discover that, while the mere existence of law 
prohibiting insider trading is ineffectual, their enforcement reduces the risk-adjusted expected 
return on equity. After controlling for risk factors, a liquidity factor and other legal determinants 
of the cost of equity, the assessment finds that the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces 
the cost of equity by 5%. Himmelberg et al.(2004) hypothesize that lack of investor protection 
forces company insiders to hold greater fractions of the equity of the companies they manage. 
These high holdings subject insiders to a greater rate of idiosyncratic risk that in turn increase the 
risk premium and thus the marginal cost of capital. They postulate a negative link between the 
degree  of  investor  protection  and  the  fraction  of  equity  held  by  insiders  and  a  positive 
relationship between equity ownership and the marginal return to capital. 
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2.3  African perspective of governance and stock market performance
2.3.1 Motivations for African stock market performance
In line with Asongu(2012a), although a number of papers have investigated the dynamic 
performance of equity markets worldwide, the emphasis has often been on developed economies 
and the emerging markets of Latin America and Asia. With respect to Alagidede(2008), such 
neglect  is  far  from surprising as  Africa’s  markets  are  perceived as excessively risky,  highly 
illiquid  with  less  developed  operating  institutional  environments.  Economic  instability  and 
political  strife have plagued many African countries and continue to pose a threat to foreign 
investments(Kenyan  post  election  crises  in  2007/2008,  Zimbabwe’s  economic  meltdown, 
Nigeria’s marred transition in 2008, the unending Egyptian revolution, not to mention recent 
coups d’état in Mali and Guinea-Bissau). But for South Africa, no African country has emerged 
as an economic power. This might partly elucidate the lack of academic research on the capital  
markets  of  the  continent.  Africa  has  recently  witnessed  significant  economic  and  financial 
developments,  thus  how formal  institutions  are  playing-out  in  the  development  of  financial 
markets in the continent could have important policy implications. 
Financial theory deems integrated and performing markets to be relatively more efficient 
compared to divergent ones. An integrated and performing stock market stimulates cross-border 
flow  of  funds,  improves  trading  volume  which  in-turn  increases  stock  market  liquidity. 
Developed  markets  grant  investors  the  opportunity  to  efficiently  allocate  capital(Chen  et 
al.,2002;  Asongu,  2012bcd).  This  results  in  a  lower  cost  of  capital  for  firms  and  lower 
transaction cost for investors(Kim et al.,2005). More so, a performing financial market has the 
positive  rewards  to  financial  stability  as  it  minimizes  the  probability  of  asymmetric 
shocks(Umutlu  et  al.,2010).  Financial  stability  in-turn  may  reduce  the  risk  of  cross-border 
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financial  contagion(Beine  et  al.,2010)  and  improve  the  capacity  of  economies  to  absorb 
shocks(Yu et al., 2010).  
It is also worth pointing-out stock markets may also be performing to reflect the level of 
arbitrage activity. When markets are well developed, it  denotes there is a common force such as 
arbitrage activity that attracts the markets together. It further implies that the development of 
markets  will  mean  the  potential  for  making  above  normal  profits  and   international 
diversification will be limited as supernormal profits are arbitraged away(Von Furstenberg & 
Jeon, 1989). In the same line of march, if barriers or potential barriers generating country risks 
and exchange rate premiums are absent, the consequence is similar yields for financial assets of 
similar risk and liquidity regardless of nationality and locality(Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).
Therefore, the need for African stock market development draws on the tenets of arbitrage and 
the hypothesis  proffered by the portfolio  theory.  This implies,  the motivations  for growth in 
financial markets has premises in the literature of stock market interdependence and  portfolio 
diversification(Grubel.,1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970). 
2.3.2  Institutions, finance and African business 
But  for  a  few  exceptions(Osinubi  &  Amaghionveodiwe,2003)5,  historically  capital 
markets have played a significant role in financing the development of African economies. In 
line  with  the  literature(Gray  & Bythewood,  2001; Alagidede,2008;  Asongu,2012a),  African 
securities  markets  have  not  received  the  academic  attention  of  those  in  Latin  America  and 
Southeast Asia. As sustained by Gray & Bythehood(2001), African governments are focusing on 
the importance of moving toward more market-oriented economies and developing the financial 
market infrastructure to mobilize funds from both the private and public sectors. This motivation 
5 This study empirically assessed the relationship between stock market development and long-run economic growth 
in Nigeria for the period 1980 to 2000 and no significant effect of the former on the later was found. 
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stems  from  issues  of  finance  in  small  and  medium-size  enterprises(SMEs)  in  developing 
countries  that  have  dominated  the  research  agenda  at  various  policy  levels(Quartey,2003; 
Biekpe,2004). 
Some studies have recommended regional cooperation as a possible way of alleviating 
the problem resulting from small financial systems(Bossone & Honohan, 2003). The absence of 
standardized rules and regulations(Clark,2003) have also incited researchers to assess African 
stock market  reforms.  Ngugi et  al.(2003) have investigated how African stock markets  have 
responded to the reform process and identified three main types of reforms implemented in these 
markets since the 1990s, namely: revitalization of the regulatory framework, modernization of 
trading systems and relaxation of restrictions on foreign investors. A comparative analysis across 
sampled  countries  has  demonstrated  that  markets  with  advanced  trading  technology,  tight 
regulatory system and relaxed foreign investors’ participation show greater efficiency and lower 
market volatility. These strands on reforms have been confirmed by Mutenheri & Green(2003) in 
a Zimbabwean context. They examined financial reforms and financing decisions of listed firms 
in the country to find out that the difference between the pre-reform and post-reform era suggest 
that the reforms achieved some success in opening-up the capital markets and improving the 
transparency of firm financing behavior. 
Another strand of issues in African business  focuses on how to improve Africa’s share of 
FDI. Rolfe & Woodward(2004) have investigated the Zambian experience of attracting foreign 
investment  through  privatization.  Findings  show  that  despite  increased  foreign-investment 
during the 1990s, the economy has stagnated. They conclude that, having sold-off its state assets 
Zambia  like  other  sub-Saharan  African(SSA)  countries  must  endeavor  to  attract  investment 
through other channels. Much recently, Bartels et al.(2009) have assessed the reason SSA’s FDI 
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share has  persistently  averaged 1% of global  flows.  Motivated  by the intuition  that  location 
decision and perceptions of investors are very instructive in policy making, they analyze a survey 
of perceptions, operations and motivations of 758 foreign investors in 10 SSA countries. Their 
results  show  that,  the  provision  of  transaction  cost-reducing  information  on  industries  and 
markets on the one hand and utility services to investors on the other hand , before and after a 
firm’s FDI decision are significant factors. Hence they conclude that FDI location decision in 
SSA is  influenced  by strongly political  economy considerations,  while  labor  and production 
input variables are not influential. As a broad extension of this analysis, using microdata and 
firm interviews to explore the role of FDI drivers in South Africa, Toumi(2011) uses a micro 
level of analysis which enables specification of the investment climate constraints and finds that 
political and regulatory uncertainty, skills, labor regulation and exchange volatility are decisive 
factors.  Two insights  relevant  to  the  context  of  this  paper  could  be  drawn from the  above 
literature:(1) the need for an alternative source of finance beside FDI and; (2) the imperative 
character of formal institutions in ensuring smooth financing activities for African business.  
Institutional  issues  plaguing African  business  have been buttressed by recent  studies. 
Kolstad & Wiig (2011) investigating Chinese FDI in Africa have established that  these(FDIs) 
are resources-driven and conclude: exploiting resources and weak institutions appears to be the 
name of the investment game in Africa.  Most recently Darley(2012) has presented public policy 
challenges,  strategies  and implications  on the issue of  increasing SSA’s share of  FDI.   The 
author  describes  anecdotal  predictors  of  FDI  inflows  which  include  key  indicators  of 
development,  governance  variables,  information  infrastructure  and  business  environment. 
Among the suggested strategies and implications are: looking outside the traditional inflows of 
FDI to  Africa,  establishing  carefully  monitored  export  processing  zones,  expanding regional 
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trading arrangements,  working together  to  change the negative  perception  of  the  region and 
reducing corruption. 
2.3.3  Scope and positioning of the paper
The available weight of evidence on institutional challenges to African business could be 
summarized in three strands: (1)there are crucial needs for capital inflows, regulatory reforms 
and institutional quality : having sold a great chunk of its state assets Zambia like other sub-
Saharan African countries must endeavor to attract investment through other channels (Rolfe & 
Woodward,2004);  (2)  capital  location  decision  in  SSA  is  influenced  by  strongly  political 
economy  considerations  (Bartels  et  al.,2009);  and  (3)  political  &  regulatory  uncertainty 
(Toumi,2011) and reducing corruption (Darley,2012) are crucial for capital flows. 
Perhaps one of the most exhaustive study known to African business that underlines the 
need  for  GQ  is  by  Goldsmith(2003).  In  a  survey  of  business  and  government  leaders  on 
perceptions of governance in Africa, the paper reviews 800 business leaders in Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Senegal,  Tanzania,  Uganda and Zambia.  Like  most  African  countries, 
these eight countries had undertaken governance reforms over the past decade. Thus the survey 
aimed to learn how business and government leaders perceive those recent governance reforms. 
Most respondents saw major problems with governance, though across countries they reported 
an impression of improvement and expected further gains. The findings presented grounds for 
wary optimism about business-government relations in the region. Owing to the need for finance 
in the African continent, the need to look for other sources of investment beside FDI(as a result 
of  failed  privatization)  and  the  established  role  of  stock  market  development  in  economic 
growth;  it is imperative to assess the role of governance on  stock market development. 
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The dual  aim of  this  study as  well  as  its  fivefold  contribution  to  the  literature  have 
already been substantially covered in the introduction of the paper. The empirical section will 
assess three main concerns:  (1) investigate  how the process by which those in  authority are 
selected and replaced(political governance: voice & accountability and political stability) affect 
the smooth running of financial markets; (2) assess the manner in which stock market health is 
affected by the capacity of governments to formulate & implement policies, as well as deliver 
services(economic governance: regulatory quality and government effectiveness); (3) examine 
how the respect of citizens and state for institutions that govern interactions among them affect 
capital markets(institutional governance: rule of law and corruption control).
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We investigate  a panel  of 14 African countries with data  from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) ranging from 1990 to 2010. Corresponding variables 
and countries are presented in the appendices (Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively).  In 
accordance with Yang (2011), dependent variables are stock market capitalization, stock market 
value traded, stock market  turnover,  and number of listed companies.   In line with the IMF 
(2005)  definition,  government  quality  independent  variables  include:  corruption-control, 
government-effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability or no violence, rule of law 
and regulation quality. Instrumental variables are: legal-origins, press-freedoms, income-levels 
and religious-dominations.  These instruments have been largely documented in the economic 
development  literature  (La Porta  et  al.,  1997;  Stulz  & Williamson,  2003;  Beck et  al.,  2003; 
Agbor,  2011;  Asongu,  2011bc).  More  so,  Gray  &  Bythewood(2001)  have  concluded  that 
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historical  and  cultural  factors  play  a  significant  role  in  the  characteristics  of  African  stock 
markets. The instrumental variables are dummy variables(see Appendix 1) and the presence of 
perfect negative correlations  (between: French and English; Islam and Christian; Low-income 
and Middle-Income countries)  means  the  relationship  that  appears  to  exist  between the  two 
variables is negative 100% of the time. For instance, no French country is English at the same 
time and vice versa. This interpretation also holds for religious-domination and income-level 
dummies. In the regressions we control for GDP growth and population growth at the first-stage 
and only for the former in the two-stage regressions. 
Summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively. While the former indicates that the distributions of the variables are comparable, 
the  later  guides  the  empirical  analysis  in  avoiding  issues  related  to  multicolinearity  and 
overparametization.  Only  14  African  countries  are  included  instead  of  the  whole  continent 
because only these countries have well functioning stock-markets will exploitable data. 
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity 
While GQ affects stock market performance, activities of financial markets also have a 
bearing  on  GQ.  Though  some  scholars  take  a  restrained  view,  others  argue  that  financial 
globalization  generates  a  ‘golden  straightjacket’  for  governments  (Friedman,  1999).  At  the 
extreme,  financial  markets  become  masters  of  governments,  eviscerating  the  authority  of 
national states (Helleiner, 1994; Strange, 1996; Cerny, 1999). Investors’ capacity for exit and the 
political  voice  it  confers  is  crucial  to  these  accounts.  Whereas  financial  market  openness 
provides governments with greater access to capital,  it  also subjects them to external market 
discipline (Armijo, 1999; Obstfeld & Taylor, 2004). Governments must sell their policies not 
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only to voters but also to foreign investors. Based on the fact that investors can respond swiftly 
and severely to actual or expected outcomes, government must consider financial participants’ 
preferences when choosing policies. The logic follows that financial openness should reduce the 
capacity of governments to tax and spend or more generally pursue divergent policies. Therefore 
this evidence of reverse-causality presents an important issue of endogeneity that should be taken 
into account by the estimation technique. More so, GQ indicators are perception-based measures 
which further confirm the endogeneity issue due to biased perceptions and omitted variables.
Beside the most important source of endogeneity which is reverse-causality as described 
above,  it   can  also  arise  from measurement  error,  autoregression  with  autocorrelated  errors, 
simultaneity, omitted variables and sample selection errors.
3.2.2 Estimation Technique
In accordance with Beck et al.(2003) and recent African law-finance literature(Asongu, 
2011bc)  the  paper  adopts  an  Instrumental  Variable(IV)  estimation  technique.  IV  estimates 
address the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoid the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the explaining variables are correlated with the error term 
in the equation of interest. In line with Asongu (2011bc), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) 
estimation method adopted by this paper will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigitQualityGov )(' 10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                                                  (1) 
Second-stage regression:
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++= itit tChannelGovFinance )'(10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                                                               (2) 
In the two equations,  X is a set of explaining control variables. For the first and second 
equations,   v  and u, respectively represent  the disturbance  terms.  Instrumental  variables  are 
legal-origins, dominant-religions, press-freedoms and income-levels. In Eq.(1), ‘ tQualityGov' ’ 
represents: regulation quality, the rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability, voice 
& accountability and corruption-control. ‘ Finance ’ in Eq.(2) denotes stock market performance 
dynamics of: stock market capitalization, stock market value traded, stock market turnover ratio 
and number of listed companies. 
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS  over  an  OLS  estimation  technique  with  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-account, the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables 
(GQ channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the equation of interest 
through an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. 
3.2.3 Robustness checks  
To ensure robustness of the analysis, the following checks will be carried out: (1) usage 
of alternative indicators of GQ dynamics; (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable sets of 
moment conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) usage of alternative 
indicators of stock market performance; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
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This section addresses the ability of exogenous components of GQ dynamics to account 
for differences in stock market performance; the ability of the instruments to explain variations 
in the endogenous components of GQ dynamics and the possibility of the instruments to account 
for stock market performance beyond GQ dynamic channels. To make these investigations, we 
use  the  TSLS-IV  estimation  method  with  legal-origins,  press-freedoms,  income-levels  and 
religious-dominations as instrumental variables.
4.1 Quality of government and instruments
Table 1 assesses the validity of the instruments in explaining differences in GQ. Clearly it 
could  be  observed  that  distinguishing  African  countries  by  legal-origins,  income-levels, 
religious-denominations and press-freedoms help explain cross-country differences in GQ. The 
instruments  taken together  enter  significantly in  all  regressions at  the 1% significance  level. 
Broadly, the following could be established. (1) But for political stability,  English common-law 
countries have substantially better levels of GQ than their French civil-law counterparts; broadly 
in accordance with the law-finance (growth) literature (La Portal et al., 1997, 1998; Beck et al., 
2003) and recent African law-finance (growth) literature (Asongu, 2011bcdef; Agbor, 2011). (2) 
But for political-stability,  the dominance of Christian nations over those of Moslem decent is 
very significant; which is broadly consistent with El Badawi, & Makdisi (2007).  (3)With the 
exception of political  stability,  GQ increases with income-levels;  broadly in accordance with 
Narayan et  al.(2011).  This  interpretation  is  only valid  without  the decomposition  of middle-
income  countries.  However,  when  middle-income  countries  are  sub-divided  into  lower  and 
higher  middle  income  components,  further  exceptions  apply.  These  exceptions  apply  to  the 
wealth-effects on government effectiveness and voice & accountability. In fact there appears to 
be a U-shape relationship between income-levels and these GQ dynamics: as you move from 
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low-income  to  lower-middle-income,  then  to  middle-income  and  lastly  to  higher  income 
countries.  (4)  GQ  improves  with  press-freedom;  contrary  to  Vaidya  (2005)  and  Oscarsson 
(2008). 
4.2 Stock market performance (SMP) and quality of government  
Table 2 investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of GQ channels to account for SMP 
dynamics and; (2) the possibility of the instrumental variables explaining SMP dynamics beyond 
GQ channels.  Whereas we address the first  issue by assessing the significance of estimated 
coefficients, the second is looked at through the OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the 
position that the instruments account for SMP dynamics only through GQ channels.  Thus  a 
rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection of the view that the instruments explain SMP 
dynamics through no other mechanisms than GQ channels. The Hausman test for endogeneity 
precedes every IV regression. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that OLS estimates 
are consistent and efficient. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the issue of 
reverse-causality (endogeneity)6 we have elucidated earlier (see Section 3.2.1) and hence lends 
credit  to  the  IV  estimation  technique.  Otherwise  we  estimate  by  OLS.  In  some  cases,  the 
adjusted coefficient of determination is negative and thus we do not report any results pertaining 
to  the regressions.  For robustness  purposes,  results  are  replicated  using an alternative  set  of 
instrumental variables, as depicted in the second and third to the last lines of Panels A-B in Table 
2. 
With  regard  to  the  first  concern  which  is  addressed by the  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients, it can be firmly established that GQ dynamics significantly improve SMP in Africa. 
6 Beside the most important source of endogeneity which is reverse-causality as described in Section 3.2.1, the  
phenomenon  can also arise as a result of measurement error, autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneity, 
omitted variables and sample selection errors.
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As  concerns  the  second-issue,  failure  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  the  OIR  test  in  all 
regressions (where applicable) signifies that the instruments do not explain SMP through some 
other mechanisms beyond GQ channels. Thus the instruments are valid and not correlated with 
the error term in the equation of interest; the instruments do not suffer-from endogeneity. 
The difference in the signs of growth elasticities in Table 1-2 could be explained on two 
counts:  firstly,  they are subject  to  different  outcome variables  and;  secondly,  while  those in 
Table 2 are contingent on the instruments, the growth elasticities in Table 1 are not based on any 
moment conditions. 
4.3 Discussion of results, policy implications and limitations 
The results demonstrate that GQ is positively associated with stock market performance 
in  the  African  continent;  consistent  with  Hooper  et  al.  (2009).  Thus  countries  that  have  an 
efficient  institutional  environment  should  expect  improvements  in  their  stock  market 
performance dynamics. Risk-averse investors would not invest in countries that are not mean-
variance efficient. Results indirectly support the view that the quality of governance reduces both 
transaction and agency costs, which maximize shareholder return.
The findings of this paper integrate various strands of the African business literature from 
three  perspectives:  the  need  for  institutional  reforms;  issues  in  the  financing  of  SMEs  and 
alternative  sources  of  FDI.  (1)  With  regard  to  the  need  for  reforms,   results  support:  the 
imperative  of  standardized  rules  and  regulation(Clark,2003),  especially  a  revitalization  of 
regulation (Ngugi,2003), since a tight regulation will lead to greater market efficiency and low 
volatility(Mutenheri  & Green(2003).  (2)  As  sustained by Gray & Bythehood(2001),  African 
governments are focusing on the importance of moving toward more market-oriented economies 
and developing the financial market infrastructure to mobilize funds from both the private and 
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public  sectors.  This  motivation  stems  from  issues  of  finance  in  small  and  medium-size 
enterprises(SMEs) in developing countries that have dominated the research agenda at various 
policy levels(Quartey,2003; Biekpe,2004). Hence the improvement of government quality could 
enhance stock market performance and represent a good opportunity for the financing of SMEs. 
(3) As to what concerns alternative sources to FDI, owing to the failure of the privatization 
process  in  attracting  investment  into  many  African  countries(Rolfe  &  Woodward,2004), 
improvements in political economy considerations(Bartels et al.,2009), especially the mitigation 
of  political  & regulatory uncertainty(Toumi,2011)  and reduction  of corruption(Darley,  2012) 
will increase the possibility of funding through stock markets as well as create an appealing 
atmosphere for the return of the much needed FDI. 
Many African countries especially those in French speaking sub-Saharan Africa have 
stock markets that are taking too long to pick-up. The road to stock market development depends 
significantly on institutional  arrangements  and the regulatory environment.  Quite  often these 
arrangements  have  been  ignored.  Corruption  remains  dire  in  the  continent  and represents  a 
significant risk to financial market development. To sum up, a policy recommendation to African 
countries  could be summarized in the following:  increase the control  of corruption;  improve 
government effectiveness; avoid incidences of violence and political instability that send wrong 
signals  to  international  investors;  promote  institutions  of  voice  and  accountability;  maintain 
sound regulation quality and respect for the rule of law. These recommendations are broadly in 
line with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) who argue that improving corporate governance rules, their 
enforcements and the quality of accounting standards results in greater reliance on stock market 
financing by companies.
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The  main  limitation  of  this  work  is  that  it  doesn’t  incorporate  the  diversification 
dimension into the analysis. It has been well documented that integration reduces the country 
risk effects on the decision of investment (Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999; Hail & Leuz, 
2003).  Therefore  with  international  market  integration  and  diversification,  poor  governance 
impact on SMP could become insignificant. In this context, stocks in a market with higher risk 
and  lower  returns  are  still  held  by  risk-averse  investors  due  to  the  portfolio  diversification 
benefits. However, this limitation (absence of diversification dimension) doesn’t much apply to 
African stock markets owing to relatively lower levels of integration (with the exceptions of 
South Africa and Egypt).  Another important limitation worth mentioning is that this  kind of 
analysis depends to a great extent on the integrity of the proxy for GQ obtained from perception-
based  measures.  Therefore  omitted  variables  and  media-effect  may  significantly  influence 
perceptions  of  GQ  and  consequently  bias  the  link  between  the  GQ  indicators  and  the 
performance measures. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no better indicators of 
GQ other than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The paper has 
limited this setback by using six different measures of GQ. Also the use of a methodology that 
accounts for endogeneity addresses concerns of omitted-variables and bias in the perception-
based measures.  
5. Conclusion
Many  African  countries  especially  those  in  French  speaking  sub-Sahara  have  stock 
markets that are taking too long to pick-up. How do government policies and institutions affect 
stock market performance? As stock markets grow broader and deeper in developing countries, 
the  question  becomes  more  critical.  Government  quality  dynamics  of  corruption-control, 
government-effectiveness, political-stability or no violence, voice and accountability, regulation 
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quality and rule of law have been instrumented with income-levels, religious-dominations, press-
freedom  degrees  and  legal  origins  to  account  for  stock  market  performance  qualities  of 
capitalization, value traded, turnover and number of listed companies. The results demonstrate a 
significant positive association between stock market performance measures and the quality of 
government  institutions.  These  findings  suggest  countries  with  better  developed  government 
institutions would favor stock markets with higher market capitalization, better turnover ratios, 
higher value in shares traded and greater number of listed companies.
A future research direction on the association between institutional factors and financial 
markets should use firm-specific indicators to confirm the findings. Also, exploring how foreign 
direct  investment  is  impacted  by  the  quality  of  government  could  have  interesting  policy 
implications. 
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Table 1: First-stage regressions (Government quality and instruments)
Dependent Variables 
Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality Rule of  Law
Constant -2.865 *** -0.301* -1.329*** -0.254* -0.906*** -1.103*** -3.739*** -6.693*** -3.235*** -0.764*** -2.886*** -0.684***
(-8.948) (-1.851) (-7.190) (-1.666) (-3.748) (-7.964) (-6.762) (-4.733) (-9.485) (-4.556) (-7.490) (-3.467)
Legal-
origins
English  common-law 0.711*** --- 0.342** --- -0.055 --- 1.481*** --- 0.538*** --- 0.771*** ---
(4.642) (2.438) (-0.485) (5.694) (3.357) (4.251)
French civil-law --- -0.495*** --- -0.432*** --- 0.108 --- 7.477*** --- -0.518*** --- -0.725***
(-3.053) (-3.007) (0.810) (5.637) (-3.204) (-3.809)
Religions
Christianity 0.955*** --- --- --- -0.050 --- 1.545*** --- 1.180*** --- 0.984*** ---
(5.722) (-0.420) (5.633) (6.976) (5.147)
Islam --- -0.924*** --- -0.887*** --- -0.058 --- 7.256*** --- -1.223*** --- -1.078***
(-5.514) (-5.495) (-0.420) (5.208) (-7.230) (-5.418)
Income 
Levels
Low Income --- -0.520*** --- -0.485*** --- 0.628*** --- 9.248*** --- -0.489*** --- -0.234
(-3.991) (-3.937) (5.895) (8.685) (-3.794) (-1.546)
Middle Income 1.070*** --- 0.874*** --- 0.650*** --- 0.931*** --- 0.941*** --- 0.912*** ---
(10.27) (8.970) (8.466) (5.298) (8.685) (7.446)
Lower Middle  Income -0.376** --- -0.769*** --- -1.237*** --- -0.499* --- -0.435*** --- -0.640*** ---
(-2.423) (-5.277) (-11.06) (-1.953) (-2.762) (-3.596)
Upper Middle Income --- 0.592*** --- 0.591*** --- 1.443*** --- 13.838*** --- 0.516*** --- 0.820***
(3.948) (3.944) (11.46) (10.88) (3.387) (4.571)
Press 
Freedoms
Free 0.452*** --- 0.519*** --- 0.747*** --- -0.002 --- 0.344*** --- 0.395*** ---
(3.956) (4.758) (8.697) (-0.013) (2.842) (2.884)
Partly Free 0.115 --- 0.132 --- 0.284*** --- -0.392** --- 0.163 --- -0.006 ---
(1.088) (1.224) (3.631) (-2.194) (1.482) (-0.054)
No Freedom --- -0.173* --- -0.183* --- -0.461*** --- -3.151*** --- -0.232** --- -0.146
(-1.731) (-1.846) (-5.354) (-3.750) (-2.233) (-1.195)
Control 
Variables
GDP Growth --- 0.032*** --- 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.064*** 0.156** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.044***
(3.523) (4.826) (5.370) (5.231) (4.258) (1.985) (4.304) (4.496) (3.836) (4.058)
Population Growth 0.166*** 0.044 0.113*** --- 0.120*** 0.081* 0.033 0.209 0.348*** 0.332*** 0.103* 0.069
(3.747) (0.837) (2.763) (3.133) (1.821) (0.385) (0.494) (6.410) (6.146) (1.692) (1.096)
Adjusted R² 0.811 0.813 0.829 0.813 0.926 0.898 0.716 0.708 0.823 0.819 0.809 0.788
Fisher test 67.539*** 68.266*** 80.633*** 79.760*** 173.466*** 138.922*** 35.440*** 57.919*** 64.372*** 71.658*** 58.819*** 59.160***
Observations 109 109 99 109 110 110 110 165 110 110 110 110
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.
28
Table 2: Two-stage regressions (Stock market performance and government quality)
Dependent Variables 
Panel A:   Stock Market Capitalization and  Total Value Traded
Stock Market  Capitalization Stock  Market Value  Traded
Constant 0.627*** 0.210*** 0.707*** n.a 0.638*** 0.630*** 0.174* 0.210*** 0.217*** n.a 0.168* 0.166*
(3.605) (4.531) (9.283) (3.575) (3.449) (1.866) (4.531) (4.664) (1.822) (1.743)
Control of Corruption 0.462*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.190*** --- --- --- --- ---
(4.199) (3.190)
Government Effectiveness --- 0.189*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.189*** --- --- --- ---
(3.671) (3.671)
Voice & Accountability --- --- 0.290*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.131*** --- --- ---
(4.792) (3.469)
Political  Stability --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- n.a --- ---
Regulation Quality --- --- --- --- 0.540*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.218*** ---
(4.135) (3.119)
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- --- 0.401*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.162***
(4.036) (3.050)
GDP  Growth -0.029 -0.016* -0.041*** n.a -0.033 -0.021 -0.006 -0.016* -0.013* --- -0.006 -0.001
(-0.759) (-1.920) (-3.219) (-0.847) (-0.542) (-0.297) (-1.920) (-1.730) (-0.293) (-0.051)
Hausman test 19.074*** 0.201 1.059 53.801*** 15.435*** 40.681*** 14.389*** 0.201 1.438 26.733*** 5.904* 27.894***
OIR-Sargan 1.333 n.a n.a n.a 1.210 0.809 0.935 n.a n.a n.a 1.793 1.159
P-value [0.721] [0.750] [0.847] [0.816] [0.616] [0.762]
Cragg-Donald 3.581 n.a n.a n.a 3.916 3.860 3.482 n.a n.a n.a 3.863 3.828
Adjusted R² 0.094 0.131 0.145 -0.019 0.082 0.034 0.035 0.087 0.073 -0.017 0.055 0.001
Fisher 10.564*** 6.770*** 13.473*** n.a 10.239*** 9.722*** 6.695*** 7.004*** 6.361*** n.a 6.521*** 6.157***
Observations 105 91 148 106 106 100 127 137 101 101
Panel B:  Stock Market Turnover and Number of Listed Companies
Stock Market Turnover Number of Listed Companies
Constant n.a 0.142*** n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.126*** 0.140*** 0.102*** 0.083*** 0.135*** 0.110***
(7.910) (5.564) (4.822) (9.765) (3.778) (5.062) (11.08)
Control of Corruption n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.113*** --- --- --- --- ---
(6.562)
Government Effectiveness --- 0.070*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.124*** --- --- --- ---
(3.532) (5.265)
Voice & Accountability --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.058*** --- --- ---
(6.627)
Political  Stability --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.077*** --- ---
(5.315)
Regulation Quality --- --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.126*** ---
(5.642)
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.073***
(8.300)
GDP  Growth n.a -0.005* n.a n.a n.a n.a -0.005 -0.010 -0.003* 0.004 -0.008 -0.004***
(-1.658) (-1.177) (-1.439) (-1.869) (0.883) (-1.385) (-2.930)
Hausman test 23.554*** 0.711 3.653 26.733*** 16.414*** 54.909**** 19.159*** 6.609** 0.238 21.731*** 26.916*** 3.519
OIR-Sargan n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.436 3.265 n.a 5.250 4.324 n.a
P-value [0.932] [0.352] [0.154] [0.228]
Cragg-Donald n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 4.475 2.247 n.a 5.854 4.771 n.a
Adjusted R² -0.002 0.073 -0.0006 -0.012 -0.004 -0.018 0.265 0.093 0.217 0.154 0.176 0.307
Fisher n.a 6.330*** n.a n.a n.a n.a 26.485*** 22.102*** 21.984*** 17.915*** 20.010*** 34.477***
Observations 135 108 98 152 109 109 152
Initial Instruments Constant; Lower Middle Income; Middle Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press
Robust Instruments Constant; Upper Middle Income; Low Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Stock Market 
Performance
Stock Market  Capitalization 0.354 0.521 0.008 3.382 259
Stock Market  Value Traded  0.078 0.268 0.000 2.591 245
Stock Market Turnover 0.095 0.119 0.000 0.704 253
Number of Listed Companies 0.067 0.085 0.002 0.712 268
Government 
Quality 
Control of Corruption -0.259 0.666 -1.489 1.086 167
Government Effectiveness -0.171 0.654 -1.674 0.807 155
Political Stability -0.314 0.885 -2.530 1.122 168
Regulation Quality -0.224 0.694 -2.394 0.905 168
Rule of Law -0.325 0.756 -1.913 1.053 168
Voice and Accountability -0.389 0.793 -1.805 1.047 168
Control 
Variables
GDP growth 3.504 3.719 -17.254 12.272 294
Population growth 1.952 0.775 -0.143 3.739 294
Instrumental 
Variables
English Common-Law 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
French Civil-Law 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Christianity 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Islam 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Low Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Middle Income 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Lower Middle Income 0.428 0.495 0.000 1.000 294
Upper Middle Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Press Freedom 0.345 0.476 0.000 1.000 165
Partial Press Freedom 0.230 0.422 0.000 1.000 165
No Press Freedom 0.424 0.495 0.000 1.000 165
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis     
Stock Market Performance Quality of Government Control Vles Instrumental Variables
SMC SMVT SMT ListC CC Gov.E PolS R.Q R.L V&A GDP Popg Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree
1.000 0.863 0.733 0.242 0.19 0.308 0.008 0.22 0.165 0.310 -0.11 -0.29 0.109 -0.109 0.123 -0.12 -0.14 0.144 -0.234 0.399 0.391 -0.12 -0.272 SMC
1.000 0.795 0.084 0.15 0.273 0.045 0.21 0.119 0.257 -0.04 -0.20 0.074 -0.074 0.065 -0.06 -0.13 0.130 -0.138 0.274 0.337 -0.13 -0.215 SMVT
1.000 0.078 0.09 0.261 -0.061 0.12 0.115 0.096 -0.02 -0.30 -0.18 0.180 -0.24 0.24 -0.17 0.176 0.048 0.117 0.340 -0.06 -0.277 SMT
1.000 0.43 0.423 0.397 0.33 0.526 0.458 0.029 -0.38 0.146 -0.146 0.156 -0.15 -0.30 0.308 -0.261 0.596 0.557 -0.18 -0.375 ListC
1.00 0.912 0.826 0.82 0.899 0.719 0.299 -0.21 0.068 -0.068 0.100 -0.10 -0.48 0.482 -0.233 0.737 0.725 -0.14 -0.588 CC
1.000 0.737 0.84 0.888 0.719 0.347 -0.17 0.064 -0.064 -0.16 0.163 -0.50 0.050 -0.184 0.695 0.777 -0.00 -0.769 Gov. E
1.000 0.71 0.848 0.627 0.270 -0.24 0.211 -0.211 0.238 -0.23 -0.19 0.190 -0.375 0.601 0.591 -0.24 -0.370 PolS
1.00 0.866 0.725 0.444 0.100 0.013 -0.013 0.066 -0.06 -0.39 0.399 -0.207 0.627 0.618 -0.02 -0.583 R..Q
1.000 0.709 0.336 -0.18 0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.00 -0.39 0.391 -0.245 0.660 0.730 -0.15 -0.581 R.L
1.000 0.292 0.065 0.471 -0.471 0.397 -0.39 -0.07 0.079 -0.676 0.821 0.805 -0.00 -0.784 V&A
1.000 0.134 -0.03 0.033 -0.16 0.165 -0.17 0.174 0.070 0.097 0.254 0.107 -0.336 GDPg
1.000 0.099 -0.099 0.152 -0.15 0.214 -0.214 -0.038 -0.17 -0.24 0.253 0.017 Popg
1.000 -1.000 0.650 -0.65 0.400 -0.400 -0.730 0.400 0.229 0.173 -0.368 English
1.000 -0.65 0.65 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 -0.17 0.368 French
1.000 -1.00 0.400 -0.400 -0.730 0.400 0.229 -0.37 0.100 Christian
1.000 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 0.377 -0.100 Islam
1.000 -1.000 0.547 0.400 -0.36 -0.09 -0.268 LIncome
1.000 0.547 0.400 0.363 -0.09 -0.268 MIncome
1.000 -0.54 -0.44 0.020 0.410 LMI
1.000 0.775 -0.11 -0.648 UMI
1.000 -0.39 -0.623 Free
1.000 -0.469 PFree
1.000 NFree
SMC: Stock Market Capitalization. SMVT: Stock Market Value Traded. SMT: Stock Market Turnover. ListC: Listed Companies. CC: Control of Corruption.  Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. PolS: Political Stability or No  
Violence. R.Q: Regulation Quality. R.L: Rule of Law.  V& A: Voice and Accountability.  GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth.  Eng: English Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: Low  
Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions(Measurement) Sources
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
SMC Stock Market Capitalization(% of GDP): Measured as the share price 
times the number of shares outstanding.
World 
Bank(FDSD)
Stock Market 
Value Traded
SMVT Stock Market Total Value Traded(% of GDP): Measured as total value of 
shares traded during a given period. 
World 
Bank(FDSD)
Stock Market 
Turnover 
SMT Stock Market Turnover Ratio: Measured as total  value of shares  traded 
during a period divided by average market capitalization for that period. 
World 
Bank(FDSD)
Listed Companies ListC Number of Listed Companies Per Capita(% of Population) World 
Bank(FDSD)
Control of 
Corruption 
CC Control  of  Corruption(estimate):Captures  perceptions  of  the  extent  to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Government 
Effectiveness
Gov. E Government  Effectiveness(estimate):  Measures  the  quality  of  public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political pressures 
of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of governments commitments to such policies. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Political Stability/ 
No Violence 
PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  the perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional  and  violent  means,  including  domestic  violence  and 
terrorism. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Regulation 
Quality 
R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents  
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Voice and 
Accountability 
V & A Voice  and  Accountability  (estimate):  Measures  the  extent  to  which  a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and 
to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World 
Bank(WDI)
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World 
Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World 
Bank(WDI)
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num
Law
English Common-Law Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
French Civil-Law Ivory Coast,  Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 4
Religion 
Christianity 
Botswana,  Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya,  Mauritius, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
Islam Egypt,  Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia. 4
Income 
Levels
Low Income Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 4
Middle Income Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia.
10
Lower Middle Income Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tunisia.
8
Upper Middle Income  Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa. 4
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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